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Mark A. Graber* 
Conservative and liberal scholars are conspiring to convince 
Americans that those who framed and ratified the Constitution 
meant to secure only a narrow range of liberties. Conservative 
scholars maintain that constitutional provisions were intended to 
protect a narrow range of liberties because contemporary conserva-
tives are hostile to most individual rights. When judges and citizens 
realize that the constitutional framers protected very few freedoms, 
the right hopes, Americans will reject the liberal egalitarian values 
of the Warren Court and its academic supporters as constitutionally 
illegitimate. Liberal scholars maintain that constitutional provi-
sions were only intended to protect a narrow range of individual 
liberties because contemporary liberals are hostile to originalism. 
When judges and citizens realize that the constitutional framers 
protected very few freedoms, the left hopes, Americans will aban-
don the strict historicist methods of constitutional interpretation 
used by leading members of the Rehnquist Court and its academic 
supporters. 
To further the disparate goals of their interpretive conspiracy, 
contemporary theorists rely heavily on a selective use of history. 
Such leading-and politically diverse-constitutional commenta-
tors as Robert Bork, Raoul Berger, Paul Brest, Michael Perry and 
Thomas Grey consistently treat as authoritative historical evidence 
suggesting that seemingly broad declarations of constitutional 
rights were actually designed to achieve more limited objectives. 
Remarkably, the liberal members of this conspiracy rarely point to 
available historical evidence suggesting that the Framers used such 
open ended language as "due process," "privileges and immunities" 
and "equal protection of the laws," because they had expansive no-
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tions of the rights retained by the people.' Thus, constitutional the-
orists of quite different persuasions commonly emphasize Leonard 
Levy's controversial claim that the First Amendment was originally 
understood as only prohibiting prior restraints on speech2 and ig-
nore subsequent works which conclude that the Founding Fathers 
had significantly broader conceptions of expression rights.J 
"No law" in the First Amendment apparently has too many 
libertarian implications for members of the contemporary interpre-
tive conspiracy to interpret that phrase as meaning "no law." "No 
State" in the equal protection clause, however, has a delightfully 
inegalitarian connotation which ensures that both conservative and 
liberal law professors will interpret that phrase as meaning "no 
state." Constitutional theorists on both the left and the right insist 
that the persons responsible for framing and ratifying the Four-
teenth Amendment used the words "No State" because they in-
tended that only state officials be constitutionally prohibited from 
violating the majestic principle of equality before the law. Thus, 
their writings agree that proper originalist analysis leaves the fed-
eral government constitutionally free to discriminate on racial or 
any other grounds. Robert Bork declares that Bolling v. Sharpe, 4 
the case holding school segregation laws in the District of Columbia 
unconstitutional, is a decision that "rested on no precedent or his-
tory." "[H]istory compels the opposite conclusion," he insists, be-
cause "the equal protection clause, under which Brown had been 
decided, applied only to the states; no similar clause applied to the 
federal government, which governed the District of Columbia."s 
I. The canonical works on non-interpretivism all contain long sections endorsing the 
most restrictive historical interpretations of significant constitutional liberties. See especially 
Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. Rev. 204, 223-
24, 229-34 (1980); Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights: An 
Inquiry into the Legitimacy of Constitutional Policymaking by the Judiciary 62·90 (Yale U. 
Press, 1982); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 703, 
710-14 (1975). 
2. Leonard W. Levy, Freedom of Speech and Press in Early Amencan History (Harper 
& Row, 1963). See Grey, 27 Stan. L. Rev. at 713 (cited in note 1); Perry, The Constitution, 
the Courts, and Human Rights at 63-64 (cited in note 1). 
3. See Merrill Jensen, Book Review, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 456 (1961); Dwight L. Teeter, A 
Legacy of Expression: Philadelphia Newspapers and Congress During the War for Indepen-
dence, 1775-1783, (unpublished dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1966); David A. An-
derson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 455 (1983); David M. Rabban, 
The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American His-
tory, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 795 (1985); Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Fourth Estate and the Constitution 
22-50 (U. of Cal. Press, 1991). Indeed, even Levy now admits that the Framers had a sub-
stantially broader understanding of the First Amendment than his earlier writings suggest. 
Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press ix-xii (Oxford U. Press, 1985). 
4. 347 u.s. 497 (1954). 
5. Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 83 
(Free Press, 1990). 
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Bork's history is enthusiastically endorsed by his left-wing co-con-
spirators. Leading proponents of non-originalist theories of consti-
tutional interpretation gleefully declare that if the Supreme Court 
can only strike down those practices that the Framers would clearly 
have regarded as unconstitutional, then the Warren Court grossly 
abused the judicial power when declaring unconstitutional dual 
school systems in the nation's capital. Originalists are "entirely cor-
rect," Brest warns, when they assert that Bolling "is not supported 
by even a generous reading of the fifth amendment."6 Grey bluntly 
points out that originalism leaves the federal government "constitu-
tionally free ... to engage in explicit racial discrimination."? 
Neither Bork nor Brest (nor any of their co-conspirators) actu-
ally cite any member of the Reconstruction Congress who stated or 
otherwise maintained that the national government, unlike the 
states, would retain the power to discriminate. Nor do they point to 
any legislation considered by Congress immediately after the Civil 
War that would have clearly been unconstitutional if enacted by a 
state. Rather, this remarkable consensus among constitutional 
commentators that the equal protection clause limits only state 
power is based on only one datum, the constitutional text. The 
Fourteenth Amendment explicitly states that "no State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," and no provision in 
the Constitution explicitly declares the federal government is so 
constrained. If the Framers had wanted to limit the federal govern-
ment, conventional wisdom maintains, the Fourteenth Amendment 
would have declared that "Neither the federal government nor the 
states shall .... " Apparently, the interpretive principle at work is 
res ipsa loquitur: the thing speaks for itself. 
When the persons responsible for framing and ratifying the 
Fourteenth Amendment speak for themselves, however, they offer a 
different explanation for their failure to mention the federal govern-
ment. Although members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress did not 
specify any precise constitutional limitations, their speeches consist-
ently assumed that Congress was already constitutionally prohib-
ited from depriving any citizens of the equal protection of the law. 
Thaddeus Stevens, for example, stated that all of the provisions in 
section one are "asserted, in some form or other, in our Declaration 
or organic law." Additional constitutional language was necessary, 
6. Brest, 60 B.U. L. Rev. at 233 (cited in note 1). 
7. Grey, 27 Stan. L. Rev. at 711 (cited in note 1). I do not know of any prominent 
constitutional theorist who questions the historical/textual claims made in the above 
paragraph. 
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he informed his colleagues, because "the Constitution limits only 
the action of Congress, and is not a limitation on the States." Sec-
tion One would thus ensure that the existing constitutional limita-
tion on federal power to discriminate would henceforth also 
constrain state power. "This amendment," Stevens observed, "sup-
plies that defect, and allows Congress to correct the unjust legisla-
tion of the States, so far that the law which operates upon one man 
shall operate equally upon all. "s 
Leading participants in the debate over the Fourteenth 
Amendment treated as common knowledge the proposition that the 
pre-Civil War Constitution already prohibited federal laws inconsis-
tent with equal protection. Lyman Trumbull, the author of the 
Civil Rights Bill of 1866, asserted that one of the "fundamental 
rights" of "citizens of the United States" was that "restraints intro-
duced by law should be equal to al/."9 Representative Samuel Ran-
dall, an opponent of the amendment, claimed that "[t]he first 
section proposes to make an equality in every respect between the 
two races, notwithstanding the policy of discrimination which has 
heretofore been exclusively exercised by the States."w John Bing-
ham declared that "every word," of his proposal that "Congress 
shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and 
proper to secure to ... all persons in the several States equal protec-
tion in the rights of life, liberty, and property ... is to-day in the 
Constitution." 11 
Raoul Berger makes much of Bingham's mistaken belief that 
the phrase "equal protection . . . stands in the very words of the 
Constitution."u None of Bingham's colleagues, however, corrected 
this "error" or otherwise objected when Stevens, Trumbull and 
others indicated that the federal government was already constitu-
tionally obligated to treat all citizens equally. Instead, the Framers 
of the Fourteenth Amendment consistently proclaimed that equal 
protection was a fundamental principle that should constrain gov-
ernments in all free societies. Senator Jacob Howard, a leading 
member of the Joint Congressional Committee responsible for the 
amendment, insisted that "[ w ]ithout this principle of equal justice 
to all men and equal protection under the shield of the law, there is 
no republican government."D Representative John Farnsworth of 
8. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866). 
9. ld. at 1757. 
10. ld. at 2530. 
II. ld. at 1034. 
12. Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment 140 (Harv. U. Press, 1977) ("Government by Judiciary"). 
13. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866). 
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Illinois similarly contended that "equal protection of the laws" is 
"the very foundation of a republican government" and "the undeni-
able right of every subject ofthe Government."t4 In a more contro-
versial speech, Bingham stated that equal protection was one of 
"the inborn rights of every person" that "[n]o State ever had the 
right ... to deny."ts These hardly sound like legislators who be-
lieved that the federal government would be constitutionally free to 
discriminate against racial minorities and make other arbitrary dis-
tinctions after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Contemporary lawyers and citizens, therefore, can offer per-
fectly originalist justifications for the claim that the federal govern-
ment cannot practice racial or other forms of invidious 
discrimination. The persons responsible for framing and ratifying 
the Fourteenth Amendment intended to ensure that no governmen-
tal official could violate basic principles of equality. They chose the 
limiting phrase "No State shall deny" only because they believed 
that the Constitution already prohibited federal officials from mak-
ing arbitrary and discriminatory distinctions among individuals. A 
Fourteenth Amendment which specified that "neither Congress nor 
the states shall deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws" 
would, in their view, have been as redundant as a provision which 
stated "neither Congress nor the states shall deny due process of 
law." Originalists can, of course, debate when and whether the 
Constitution should incorporate the assumptions that constitutional 
framers make about what is already covered by the text.J6 This 
dispute, however, is between two different methods of interpreting 
the original intentions of the Framers and not between originalists 
and some other school of constitutional thought. 
More significantly, this brief explanation of the original mean-
ing of "No State" provides another example of how "law office his-
tory" perverts contemporary constitutional theory. The historical 
evidence demonstrating that members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress 
did not intend to limit equal protection constraints to the states is 
hardly obscure. The crucial statements quoted above are often 
quoted (though for other purposes) in well-read treatises on the 
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Several appear in 
14. ld. at 2539. 
15. ld. at 2542. 
16. Obviously, originalists who believe the federal government should be free to dis· 
criminate in any way among citizens must also demonstrate that the persons responsible for 
framing and ratifying the original constitution believed the federal government should be free 
to discriminate in any way among citizens. Such a proposition seems to me to be historically 
dubious. 
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Raoul Berger's Government by Judiciary.!' Constitutional theorists 
do not recognize that "No state shall deny" in the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not mean "only states shall not deny" only be-
cause such a conclusion would subvert their political purposes. 
These purposes require both conservatives and liberals to depict 
constitutional framers as fairly rigid statists. The greatest fear that 
many law professors on both the left and the right have is that his-
torical investigation will reveal that the persons responsible for 
framing and ratifying constitutional provisions shared at least some 
of the decent liberal egalitarian values that animated Earl Warren, 
William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall. 
17. See Berger, Government by Judiciary at 140-41 (quoting Bingham), 210 (quoting 
Howard) (cited in note 12). 
